This paper tests market power in the banking industry. First, I calculate pricecost margins predicted by di¤erent oligopoly models using discrete-choice demand estimates of own and cross-price elasticities. Second, I compare these predicted price-cost margins to price-cost margins computed with the observed interest rates and estimates of marginal costs. This paper is among the …rst to apply this methodology on a detailed, bank-level dataset from the retail banking sector. I extend the previous papers and illustrate the advantages of structural modelling by simulating a counterfactual merger experiment among pairs of the biggest banks and studying the unilateral e¤ect of the mergers on the interest rates. I provide another evidence that concentration measures (such as Her…ndahl index) could be very misleading indicators of market power.
Introduction
In the banking literature, until recently, the two most popular methodologies to test market power were the Panzar-Rosse (1987) test which infers conduct from the individual …rm's input-output cost relationships, and Bresnahan's (1982) conjectural variation (CV) model which focuses on market structure parameters. Degryse and Ongena (2005) summarizes the advantages of the two methods. The Panzar-Rosse test's data requirement is low and and the data are readily available across di¤erent countries while the conjectural variation model nicely embeds di¤erent types of competitive behaviour. However, Hyde and Perlo¤ (1995) …nds, that the Panzar-Rosse test is very sensitive to the speci…cation of the reduced-form revenue function and to which input factors of production are included. Corts (1999) and Nevo (1998) show that the CV methodology has problems related to the interpretation and identi…cation of the theoretical conduct parameter. 1 The structural framework in this paper avoids some of the above mentioned problems of earlier approaches. The typical structural approach is to map …rms'observed pricing decisions into their unobserved costs by estimating a demand function and assuming a particular strategic model of competition. This paper follows a di¤erent strategy. Since the main goal is to …nd the model of competition that describes the data best, I estimate demand and cost functions and try to identify the model of competition which best describes the data. First, I derive price-cost margins predicted by di¤erent strategic oligopoly models using discrete-choice demand estimates of own and cross-price elasticities. Demand for di¤erent banking services is derived from individual utility maximization and estimated with a characteristics-based discrete choice model in which the product differentiation is explicit. The discrete choice approach helps to overcome the di¢ culty of estimating a large number of substitution parameters given several banks on the market.
Second, I compare these predicted price-cost margins to price-cost margins computed with the observed interest rates and accounting estimates of marginal costs 2 . The pa- 1 See Reiss and Wolak (2005) for more details about the problems with the reduced-form approach. 2 There are a few other studies that applied "outside" estimates of marginal costs to test strategic rameter estimates are immune to the Lucas-critique (i.e. do not change with di¤erent policies) so counterfactuals can be tested on them. This is particularly important from a policy perspective (i.e. merger control, see e.g. Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) ), where a more complete structural framework might be needed to determine proper regulation.
The disadvantage of the structural framework is the rather large data requirement but this paper is fortunate to utilize a fairly detailed, bank-level dataset.
This paper is among the …rst to apply this methodology to the retail banking sector. I extend the previous papers and illustrate the advantages of structural modelling by simulating a counterfactual merger experiment among pairs of the biggest banks and studying the unilateral e¤ect of the mergers on the interest rates. Dick (2002) was the …rst to apply a structural demand model based on consumer choice under product di¤er-entiation 3 on retail deposit services using data on U.S. commercial banks. She estimates a demand function for total deposits and derives consumer welfare but she does not test and pricing equations jointly under alternative market structures. The system estimation is more e¢ cient if both the cost and demand equations are well speci…ed. Since estimating the cost function could be quite problematic this paper estimates the demand oligopoly models in di¤erent industries, for example Hendricks, Porter and Boudreau (1987) in oil and gas lease auctions, Nevo (2001) in the cereal industry, and Hortacsu and Puller (2007) in the Texas electricity spot market. 3 As developed by Berry (1994) . 4 There is a growing literature on spatial competition on banking using reduced form models. Kim and Vale (2001) and Dick(2006) and cost functions separately using the instrumentation techniques developed by Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo(2001) . This paper also extends the previous ones by analyzing the unilateral e¤ects of some counterfactual mergers in the industry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the building blocks of the structural model. In section 3 the merger simulation, in section 4 the data is discussed.
Section 5 discusses the estimation strategy along with the identifying assumptions. Section 6 presents the results of the estimation Finally, section 7 provides discussion of the results and conclusion.
The building blocks
The main building blocks of the structural approach are the demand function, the supply models and the cost function. The demand estimation follows Dick (2002) . She estimates demand for deposit services of commercial banks by aggregating heterogenous consumers' discrete choices, a standard methodology in the discrete choice literature (see Berry; 1994) .
Besides demand for deposit services, I also estimate demand for loans. For the supply side, I consider two extreme models of the banking industry: a static, di¤erentiated product Nash-Bertrand oligopoly and a cartel. For each supply model the pricing decisions of the banks depend on the individual bank-level demands. I use the estimated price elasticities to calculate price-cost margins implied by the two supply models. Finally, I estimate a translog cost function to get an empirical estimates of the marginal costs of deposit services and loans. With the estimated parameters I conduct a counterfactual experiment to measure the unilateral e¤ects of some hypothetical bank mergers.
Demand for deposit services and loans
The logit demand speci…cation is the simplest discrete-choice model in which an individual consumes one unit of a brand that yields the highest utility. In this application, consumers i = 1; :::; I t maximize their indirect utility by purchasing deposit services or taking a loan from a bank j = 0; 1; ::; J t in t = 1; :::T time period. j = 0 choice indicates the outside option of not choosing a commercial bank, which is de…ned as the total households' savings (loans) in all …nancial institutions minus the deposits (loans) in the commercial bank sector. The conditional indirect utility function of consumer i from choosing bank j's deposit services at time t includes a mean utility d jt and an individual speci…c, iid, mean zero random disturbance ijt : The closed form solution of the multinomial logit model (assuming that the unobservables'distribution is a type-I extreme value) yields bank j's market share in market d at time t as:
The consumer loan demand is speci…ed similarly to the deposit services demand. Assume that there are m = 1; :::; M t consumers interested in borrowing from a bank. Let each consumer's utility function be linear such that the conditional indirect utility of consumer i from choosing bank j's services is
where r l jt and r sl jt represents interest rates paid by consumers on loans and fees on loans respectively, and the other variables are de…ned as in equation (1).
The logit model has its well-known problems. It restricts consumers to substitute towards other brands in portion to market shares regardless of the characteristics. Moreover if the share of the outside good is too large it also biases the substitution to the inside goods downwards. Unfortunately data limitations prevent the application of more ‡exible models but in this sample these problems are perhaps not as serious because the share of the outside good is fairly small, the number of banks is quite limited and there are no huge quality di¤erences among them so it seems not too unreasonable that the market share drives the substitution patterns.
Supply of deposit services and loans
In the supply models, similarly to Nakane et al ( 
s.t:
where R jt is the net interbank exposure at r t interest rate. I t and M t are the deposit and loan market size. E jt is the bank's capital. The pro…t function consist of the revenue from the deposit markets, the revenue from the loan markets, minus the non-interest cost (C jt ), and …nally a net balance of interbank transactions (R jt ). The balance sheet constraint states that the total deposit amounts should be equal to the total loan amount plus the net interbank exposure. I assume that the interbank market is perfectly competitive and banks can borrow and lend at the same interest rate r t . The cost function consists of noninterest costs such as wages and capital costs. I assume that deposit interest rates have no e¤ect on the loan market share and vice versa. The interest rate …rst-order conditions for bank j are the following:
The …rst-order conditions can be easily transformed to the familiar Lerner-indices by dividing both sides with the appropriate interest rate. The Lerner-index states that the marginal revenue minus the marginal cost of the banks, divided by the price should be equal to the inverse of the residual demand elasticities. In our case the marginal revenue on deposits is equal to the sum of service fee and interbank interest rate. The marginal cost on deposits is equal to the paid interest rate plus the non-interest marginal cost, (c jt ). On loans the marginal revenue is the sum of the charged interest rate and service fees. The marginal cost on loans is the sum of interbank interest rate and non-interest marginal costs. 
where R jt is the net interbank exposure at r t interest rate. I t and M t are the deposit and loan market size. The interest rate …rst-order conditions for bank j:
In a collusive equilibrium the pro…t-maximizing banks internalize the negative business stealing e¤ect they have on other banks and charge a higher price (higher (lower) interest rates in case of loans (deposits).)
Cost function
The price-cost margins of course depend on the marginal costs of the banks. I estimate marginal cost using a translog cost function. I use instruments for the endogenous output variables since outputs are the choice of the bank and it can correlate with supply shocks that are in the error term. The implicit assumption in the literature is the banks operate in a perfectly competitive market so this endogeneity is usually ignored.
The …rst output is de…ned as the production of a bank in a certain sub-market (loan or deposit respectively), while the second output is the rest of its total assets. Inputs consist of labour and physical capital. Labour cost is approximated by the ratio of personnel expenses to the number of employees, while the price of physical capital is proxied by the ratio of the di¤erence between all non-interest and personnel expenses to …xed assets. The total cost is the sum of the non-interest expenses. Following Kim (1985) the cost system consists of the translog cost function and cost share equations for the inputs (Shephard's lemma):
where T C jt corresponds to total costs, Q n jt is the n th (n = 1; 2) output, P I allow the correlation of error terms on the cost function and share equations, but assume the correlation is zero across banks. Unlike in Kim(1985) , I treat output as a potentially endogenous variable and apply iterative three-stage least squares using the lagged values of ouputs and characteristics of rival banks as instruments.
Then the marginal cost function, c s jt (where s stands for the speci…c product which is always product 1 in the cost function) can be calculated by taking the …rst order condition of the translog cost function with respect to …rst output on the sub-market s in the following manner:
All banks are assumed to be X-e¢ cient.
Merger Simulation
One of the advantages of structural models over reduced forms is that the estimated parameters are immune to changes in policy or in the environment. Thus these models can be used for stress testing or merger simulations. In this paper, I consider some 
and the service fee elasticity can be calculated as:
Loan rate elasticities are calculated correspondingly. Estimates of the price-cost margins can be obtained by a simple calculation from the estimated deposit service and loan demand parameters and observed market shares. Table 3 Hansen J-test indicates that the null hypothesis of correct model speci…cation and valid overidenti…cating restrictions cannot be rejected. Table 4 reports parameter estimates for the cost function. Based on the t-statistics and the value of the adjusted R 2 the overall …t of the cost equations can be considered good for both market segments. Unfortunately not every output and input price parameters are signi…cant but they have the correct signs. The last line of Table 4 reports the imputed average marginal costs. There are a few cases (about 6 in both markets) where the estimated marginal costs were negative. Since marginal cost cannot be negative theoretically these cases were dropped. The marginal cost estimations could be a¤ected by bundling but our data does not have any information on this issue. Table 5 sector, it can be described as a competitive product-di¤erentiated Bertrand oligopoly at least on the loan and deposit markets. of market share on both market but it still seems that the small banks provide enough competitive pressure that would to keep interest rates close to the competitive one at least on the deposit side.
Results

Discussion
The Finnish banking sector is highly concentrated with the top three banks having 70% One non-competition related explanation of these observations could be that the emerging Hungarian loan markets are more risky. However even after adjusting for risks, 7 They studied the loans maket at a less aggregated product-level so the comparison are not perfect. Loans Deposits 
